We propose a new method to compute bid prices in network revenue management problems. The novel aspect of our method is that it explicitly considers the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests and generates bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. Our method is based on relaxing certain constraints that link the decisions for different flight legs by associating Lagrange multipliers with them. In this case, the network revenue management problem decomposes by the flight legs and we can concentrate on one flight leg at a time. When compared with the so-called deterministic linear program, we show that our method provides a tighter upper bound on the optimal objective value of the network revenue management problem. Computational experiments indicate that the bid prices obtained by our method perform significantly better than the ones obtained by standard benchmark methods.
The idea of bid prices forms a powerful tool for solving network revenue management problems. This idea associates a bid price with each flight leg that captures the opportunity cost of a unit of capacity. An itinerary request is accepted only if there is enough capacity and the revenue from the itinerary request exceeds the sum of the bid prices associated with the flight legs that are in the requested itinerary; see Williamson (1992) and Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) . One of the traditional approaches in the literature for computing bid prices involves solving a deterministic linear program. However, this linear program tends to be somewhat crude in the sense that it only uses the expected numbers of the itinerary requests that are to arrive until the time of departure and does not incorporate the probability distributions or temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests.
In this paper, we propose a new method to compute bid prices in network revenue management problems. Our method is motivated by the following intuitive observation. The network revenue management problem is difficult because if we accept an itinerary request, then we have to consume the capacity on every flight leg that is in the requested itinerary. We relax this requirement by using Lagrangian relaxation. In particular, we allow ourselves to individually accept or reject the flight legs that are in a requested itinerary. When we allow such "partially accepted" itineraries, the problem decomposes by the flight legs and we can concentrate on one flight leg at a time. This approach provides a method to compute bid prices that explicitly considers the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests. Furthermore, the bid prices computed in this manner depend on the remaining leg capacities, which is a feature lacking in the existing methods.
Our work builds on previous research. Hawkins (2003) and Adelman and Mersereau (2007) develop a Lagrangian relaxation method for what they call weakly coupled dynamic programs. In these dynamic programs, the evolutions of the different components of the state variable are affected by different types of decisions and these different types of decisions interact through a set of linking constraints. The authors propose relaxing the linking constraints by associating Lagrange multipliers with them. In this paper, we show that the network revenue management problem can be viewed as a weakly coupled dynamic program. In addition, the Lagrangian relaxation method in Hawkins (2003) and Adelman and Mersereau (2007) runs into computational difficulties when applied to the network revenue management problem. Specifically, this method requires finding a good set of Lagrange multipliers by minimizing the so-called dual function and the dual function may involve thousands of dimensions. We show that it is indeed possible to minimize the dual function efficiently by using standard subgradient optimization.
Network revenue management is an active area of research. The idea of bid prices dates back to Simpson (1989) and Williamson (1992) , where the authors use the deterministic linear program mentioned above to compute bid prices. Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) give a careful analysis of the policies that are based on bid prices and point out that the idea of bid prices is equivalent to using linear value function approximations in the dynamic programming formulation of the network revenue management problem. Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) propose a randomized version of the deterministic linear program that uses actual samples of the itinerary requests that are to arrive until the time of departure. Their goal is to remedy the fact that the deterministic linear program only uses the expected numbers of the itinerary requests. Phillips (2005) describes a sequential estimation procedure to compute bid prices. This procedure builds on the popular expected marginal seat revenue heuristic of Belobaba (1987) and addresses the probabilistic nature of the itinerary requests. Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) propose a method that captures the total opportunity cost of the leg capacities consumed by an itinerary request more accurately. Their method essentially uses nonseparable and concave value function approximations. Adelman (2007) computes bid prices by using the linear programming representation of the dynamic programming formulation of the network revenue management problem. His approach explicitly considers the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests, but does not generate bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. Computational experiments indicate that the bid prices obtained by the methods proposed by Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) , Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) and Adelman (2007) tend to perform better than the ones obtained by the deterministic linear program. Finally, other methods, besides bid prices, have been proposed for solving network revenue management problems. We do not go into the details of these methods and refer the reader to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) for a comprehensive coverage of the network revenue management field.
In this paper, we make the following research contributions. 1) We develop a new method to compute bid prices in network revenue management problems. Our method explicitly considers the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests and generates bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. 2) Our method is based on relaxing certain constraints by associating Lagrange multipliers with them. We show that we can efficiently find a good set of Lagrange multipliers by using standard subgradient optimization. 3) We show that our method provides an upper bound on the optimal objective value of the network revenue management problem. A well-known method to obtain such an upper bound is to use the aforementioned deterministic linear program. We show that the upper bound obtained by our approach is tighter than the one obtained by the deterministic linear program. 4) Computational experiments indicate that the bid prices obtained by our method perform significantly better than the ones obtained by standard benchmark strategies. Furthermore, our method noticeably improves the upper bounds obtained by these benchmark strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 formulates the network revenue management problem as a dynamic program. Section 2 describes the Lagrangian relaxation idea and shows that our method provides an upper bound on the optimal objective value of the network revenue management problem. Section 3 establishes that our method obtains bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. Section 4 shows that our method can efficiently find a good set of Lagrange multipliers by using standard subgradient optimization. Section 5 contrasts our method with the deterministic linear program. Section 6 presents computational experiments.
Problem Formulation
We have a set of flight legs that can be used to satisfy the itinerary requests that arrive randomly over time. At each time period, an itinerary request arrives and we have to decide whether to accept or reject this itinerary request. An accepted itinerary request generates a revenue and consumes the capacities on the relevant flight legs. A rejected itinerary request simply leaves the system. The problem takes place over the finite horizon T = {1, . . . , τ } and all flight legs depart at time period τ + 1. The set of flight legs is L and the set of itineraries is J . If we accept a request for itinerary j, then we generate a revenue of f j and consume a ij units of capacity on flight leg i. If flight leg i is not in itinerary j, then we naturally have a ij = 0. The initial capacity on flight leg i is c i1 . The probability that a request for itinerary j arrives into the system at time period t is p jt . For notational brevity, we assume that j∈J p jt = 1 for all t ∈ T . If there is a positive probability of having no itinerary requests at time period t, then we can handle this by defining a dummy itinerary ψ with a iψ = 0 for all i ∈ L, f ψ = 0 and p ψt = 1 − j∈J p jt . We assume that the itinerary requests at different time periods are independent of each other. Throughout the paper, we do not differentiate between column and row vectors. We use |A| to denote the cardinality of set A.
We let x it be the remaining capacity on flight leg i at time period t so that x t = {x it : i ∈ L} captures the remaining leg capacities at time period t. We capture the decisions at time period t by u t = {u jt : j ∈ J }, where u jt takes value 1 if we accept the itinerary request at time period t whenever this itinerary request is for itinerary j, and takes value 0 if we reject the itinerary request at time period t whenever this itinerary request is for itinerary j. Since our ability to accept an itinerary request is limited by the remaining leg capacities, the set of feasible decisions at time period t is
Using x t as the state variable at time period t, we can formulate the problem as a dynamic program. Letting C = max{c i1 : i ∈ L} and C = {0, 1, . . . , C}, since the remaining capacity on any flight leg at any time period is less than or equal to C, we use C |L| as the state space. In this case, the optimal policy can be found by computing the value functions through the optimality equation
where e i is the |L|-dimensional unit vector with a 1 in the element corresponding to i ∈ L. Given the state variable x t , it is easy to show that the optimal decisions at time period t are given by
see Adelman (2007) . The main difficulty in solving the optimality equation in (1) arises from the fact that we have to make an "all or nothing" decision. Specifically, we either accept the itinerary request, in which case the capacities on all relevant flight legs are consumed, or we reject the itinerary request, in which case the leg capacities do not change. Our solution method is based on relaxing this requirement. In other words, when an itinerary request arrives, we allow ourselves to accept or reject the individual flight legs. We make this idea precise in the following section.
Lagrangian Relaxation
In this section, we develop a solution method that is based on the idea of accepting or rejecting the individual flight legs.
We begin by introducing some new notation. We augment L by a fictitious flight leg φ with infinite capacity. We extend the decisions at time period t as y t = {y ijt : i ∈ L ∪ {φ}, j ∈ J }, where y ijt takes value 1 if we accept flight leg i when a request for itinerary j arrives at time period t, and takes value 0 otherwise. In this case, it is easy to see that the optimality equation
is equivalent to the optimality equation in (1). Since the capacity on the fictitious flight leg is infinite, we do not keep track of it in our state variable and the state variable in the dynamic program above is still x t = {x it : i ∈ L}.
In the feasible solution set of problem (3)- (6), only constraints (5) link the different flight legs. This suggests associating the Lagrange multipliers λ = {λ ijt : i ∈ L, j ∈ J , t ∈ T } with these constraints and solving the dynamic program
subject to (4), (6) (8)
where we scale the Lagrange multipliers by {p jt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T } for notational clarity. If we have p jt = 0 for some itinerary j, then the decision variables {y ijt : i ∈ L ∪ {φ}} are inconsequential and scaling the Lagrange multipliers in this manner does not create a complication. We use the superscript λ in the value functions to emphasize that the solution to the optimality equation in (7)-(9) depends on the Lagrange multipliers. We note that constraints (9) would be redundant in problem (3)-(6), but we add them to problem (7)-(9) to tighten the relaxation.
Letting y it = {y ijt : j ∈ J }, we define the set
in which case constraints (4) and (6) can succinctly be written as
The following proposition shows that the optimality equation in (7)- (9) decomposes by the flight legs.
x it ∈ C, t ∈ T is a solution to the optimality equation
for all i ∈ L, then we have
for all x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T , where we let
Proof We show the result by induction over the time periods. It is easy to show the result for the last time period. Assuming that the result holds for time period t + 1, problem (7)-(9) can be written as
We can drop the decision variables y φjt : j ∈ J by letting y φjt = 1(f j − i∈L λ ijt ≥ 0) for all j ∈ J , where 1(·) is the indicator function. The result follows by noting that the objective function and the feasible solution set of the problem above decomposes by the flight legs. 2 Therefore, we can efficiently solve the optimality equation in (7)- (9) by concentrating on one flight leg at a time. The terms on the right side of (11) can be interpreted as the value functions obtained from |L| + 1 revenue management problems, each of which involving only one flight leg. In particular, if we consider the revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i without paying attention to the other flight legs and assume that we generate a revenue of λ ijt whenever we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t, then {ϑ λ it (x it ) : x it ∈ C, t ∈ T } are the value functions associated with this revenue management problem. Similarly, if we consider the revenue management problem that takes place over the fictitious flight leg and assume that we generate a revenue of f j − i∈L λ ijt whenever we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t, then since the capacity on the fictitious flight leg is infinite, we accept an itinerary request whenever the revenue from the itinerary request is positive and { τ t =t j∈J p jt [f j − i∈L λ ijt ] + : t ∈ T } are the value functions associated with this revenue management problem.
The following proposition shows that we obtain upper bounds on the value functions by solving the optimality equation in (7)- (9).
Proof We show the result by induction over the time periods. It is easy to show the result for the last time period. We assume that the result holds for time period t + 1 and let {ŷ ijt : i ∈ L ∪ {φ}, j ∈ J } be an optimal solution to problem (3)-(6). We have
where the second equality follows from (5), the first inequality follows from the induction assumption, and the second inequality follows from the fact thatŷ φjt ∈ {0, 1} for all
is the maximum total expected revenue over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }, we can obtain a tight bound on this quantity by solving
where the equality follows from Proposition 1. The objective function of problem (12) is called the dual function. In Section 4, we show that the dual function is convex and problem (12) can be solved efficiently. However, before doing so, we take a quick detour to explain the structure of the policy obtained by approximating the value functions in (2) by using functions of the form (11).
Bid Price Structure of the Greedy Policy
Letting λ * be an optimal solution to problem (12), our solution method approximates the value functions
Specifically, given the state variable x t , if we have
and a ij ≤ x it for all i ∈ L, then we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t. It is easy to see that this idea leads to bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. Specifically, using Proposition 1, (13) can be written as
In this case, we can view
as the bid price for the x it -th unit of capacity on flight leg i. Similar to the idea of bid prices described in the introduction, if there is enough capacity and the revenue from an itinerary request exceeds the sum of the bid prices associated with the flight legs that are in the requested itinerary, then we accept the itinerary request. However, we emphasize that the bid price of a flight leg in (14) depends on the remaining leg capacity.
It is important to note that the separable structure of {V λ * t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T } plays a major role in implementing the decision rule in (13) efficiently. In particular, if the separable structure did not exist, then implementing the decision rule in (13) would require storing {V λ * t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T }. This is equivalent to storing |C| |L| |T | numbers. By using the separable structure, we can write (13) as (14) and implementing the decision rule in (14) requires storing {ϑ λ * it (x it ) : x it ∈ C, i ∈ L, t ∈ T }. This is equivalent to storing |C| |L| |T | numbers.
Minimizing the Dual Function
In this section, we show that ϑ λ i1 (c i1 ) is a convex function of λ and its subgradients can be computed by solving the optimality equation in (10). This allows us to solve problem (12) by using standard subgradient optimization.
We begin by introducing some new notation. We let {y λ ijt (x it ) : j ∈ J } be an optimal solution to problem (10), where the superscript λ and the argument x it indicate that the optimal solution depends on the Lagrange multipliers and the remaining leg capacity. In this case, (10) can be written as
To write the expression above in matrix notation, we let Y λ it be the |C| × |J |-dimensional matrix whose (x it , j)-th element is p jt y λ ijt (x it ) and Q λ it be the |C|×|C|-dimensional matrix whose (
x it ∈ C} and λ it be the vector {λ ijt : j ∈ J }, (15) can be written in matrix notation as
We are now ready to show that ϑ λ i1 (c i1 ) is a convex function of λ.
Proposition 3 For any two sets of Lagrange multipliers λ and λ o , we have
Proof We show the result by induction over the time periods. It is easy to show the result for the last time period. We assume that the result holds for time period t + 1. Since {y λ ijt (x it ) : j ∈ J } is an optimal solution to problem (10), we have
Subtracting the first expression from the second one, the resulting expression can be written in matrix notation as
The result follows by using the induction assumption that (16) and noting that the matrix Q λ it has positive elements. 2
by Proposition 3. Letting α i1 be the |C|-dimensional unit vector with a 1 in the c i1 -th element, we obtain
Therefore, ϑ λ i1 (c i1 ) has a subgradient and Theorem 3.2.6 in Bazaraa, Sherali and Shetty (1993) implies that ϑ λ i1 (c i1 ) is a convex function of λ. The dual function, being a sum of convex functions of λ, is also a convex function of λ and we can use standard subgradient optimization to solve problem (12).
Relationship with the Deterministic Linear Program
An alternative solution method for the network revenue management problem described in Section 1 is to solve a deterministic linear program. Letting w j be the number of requests for itinerary j that we plan to accept over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }, this linear program has the form
Constraints (18) ensure that the numbers of itinerary requests that we plan to accept do not violate the leg capacities, whereas constraints (19) ensure that we do not plan to accept more itinerary requests than the expected numbers of itinerary requests.
There are two main uses of problem (17)- (20). First, this problem can be used to decide whether we should accept or reject an itinerary request. In particular, letting {µ * i : i ∈ L} be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with constraints (18), the idea is to use µ * i as the bid price associated with flight leg i. If there is enough capacity and the revenue from an itinerary request exceeds the sum of the bid prices associated with the flight legs that are in the requested itinerary, then we accept the itinerary request. Specifically, if we have
and a ij ≤ x it for all i ∈ L, then we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t. LettingṼ t (x t ) = i∈L µ * i x it for all i ∈ L, t ∈ T and noting thatṼ t+1 (x t )−Ṽ t+1 (x t − i∈L a ij e i ) = i∈L a ij µ * i , it is easy to see that (21) is equivalent to approximating the value functions {V t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T } in (2) by {Ṽ t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T }. This approach is simple to implement and the computational experiments in Williamson (1992) indicate that it provides good solutions. Comparing (14) and (21), we emphasize that the bid prices obtained by solving problem (12) depend on the remaining leg capacities, whereas this is not the case for the bid prices obtained by solving problem (17)-(20).
Second, it is possible to show that the optimal objective value of problem (17)- (20) provides an upper bound on the maximum total expected revenue over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }; see Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) . In other words, letting ζ * be the optimal objective value of problem (17)- (20), we have V 1 (c 1 ) ≤ ζ * . This information can be useful when assessing the optimality gap of a suboptimal policy such as the one in (14) or (21).
In the remainder of this section, we show that
Therefore, we can obtain a tighter upper bound on V 1 (c 1 ) by solving problem (12). Since the first inequality above follows from Proposition 2, we concentrate only on the second inequality.
Using the decision variables {z ij : i ∈ L ∪ {φ}, j ∈ J }, we write problem (17)- (20) as
By duality theory, there exist Lagrange multipliers (24), (25), (27) has the same optimal objective value as problem (23)- (27) . Noting the upper and lower bounds on the decision variables {z φj : j ∈ J }, the problem above becomes
Letting {µ i : i ∈ L} be the dual variables associated with constraints (29), the dual of problem (28)- (30) can be written as
Therefore, problem (31)- (33) has the same optimal objective value as problem (17)- (20). We are now ready to show that (22) holds.
Proof We let {µ * i : i ∈ L} be an optimal solution to problem (31)- (33) and define the Lagrange
We begin by using induction over the time periods to show that
For the last time period, we have
where the first inequality follows from (32) and the second inequality follows from the fact that y iτ ∈ Y iτ (x iτ ). Therefore, the result holds for the last time period. Assuming that the result holds for time period t + 1, we have
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption and the second inequality follows from (32). This establishes that
where the first equality follows from Proposition 1 and the second equality follows by noting the objective function of problem (31)- (33). 2
Computational Experiments
In this section, we compare the performance of our solution method with the performances of several benchmark strategies.
Benchmark Strategies
We compare the performances of the following six benchmark strategies.
Lagrangian relaxation (LR) This is the solution method that we develop in this paper, but our practical implementation refines the value function approximations five times over the decision horizon by solving problem (12) at time periods {1+k τ /5 : k = 0, 1, . . . , 4}. Specifically, given the state variable x 1+k τ /5 at time period 1 + k τ /5, we solve the problem min λ V λ 1+k τ /5 (x 1+k τ /5 ) to obtain an optimal solution λ k * and use {V λ k * t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T } as approximations to the value functions until we solve problem (12) again.
We use standard subgradient optimization to solve the problem min λ V λ 1+k τ /5 (x 1+k τ /5 ) ; see Wolsey (1998) . We initialize the step size parameter to j∈J f j /|J |, and double the step size parameter after each iteration that results in a decrease in the objective function value and halve the step size parameter after each iteration that results in an increase in the objective function value. Although it does not guarantee convergence to an optimal solution, adjusting the step size parameter in this manner provides good solutions and stable performance. 
Randomized linear program (RLP)
For brevity of discussion, we describe RLP and the following three solution methods under the assumption that the bid prices are computed only once at the beginning of the decision horizon. We emphasize that our practical implementations of these solution methods refine the bid prices five times over the decision horizon by using approaches similar to those that we use for LR and DLP. DLP uses only the expected numbers of itinerary requests and RLP tries to make up for this shortcoming by using actual samples. In particular, we let D jt be the number of requests for itinerary j at time period t so that we have P{D jt = 0} = 1−p jt and P{D jt = 1} = p jt . We generate S independent samples of D = {D jt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T }, which we denote byD s = {D s jt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T } for s = 1, . . . , S. We replace the right side of constraints (19) see Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) . Furthermore, it is possible to show that V 1 (c 1 ) ≤ E{L 1 (c 1 , D) }. Therefore, RLP also provides an upper bound on the maximum total expected revenue over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }, but computing the expectation E{L 1 (c 1 , D)} requires estimation through simulation. We use S = 50 in our computational experiments.
Finite differences on deterministic linear program (DFD) The idea behind DFD is to try to capture the total opportunity cost of the leg capacities consumed by an itinerary request more accurately.
In particular, we let L 1 (c 1 ) be the optimal objective value of problem (17)- (20). We replace the right side of constraints (18) with {c i1 − a ij : i ∈ L} and solve problem (17)- (20) to obtain the optimal objective value L
and a ij ≤ x it for all i ∈ L, then we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t; see Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) .
Finite differences on randomized linear program (RFD) RFD is a natural extension of RLP and DFD, but it did not appear in the literature previously. Similar to RLP, we generate S independent samples of D = {D jt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T }, which we denote byD s = {D s jt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T } for s = 1, . . . , S. We replace the right side of constraints (19) with { t∈TD s jt : j ∈ J } and solve problem (17)- (20) to obtain the optimal objective value L 1 (c 1 ,D s ). We then replace the right side of constraints (18) with {c i1 −a ij : i ∈ L} and the right side of constraints (19) with { t∈TD s jt : j ∈ J }, and solve problem (17)- (20) to obtain the optimal objective value L
and a ij ≤ x it for all i ∈ L, then we accept a request for itinerary j at time period t. We use S = 50 in our computational experiments.
Linear value function approximations (LV) It is well-known that V 1 (c 1 ) can be computed by solving the linear program
where {V t (x t ) : x t ∈ C |L| , t ∈ T } are the decision variables. One approach to deal with the large number of decision variables in the problem above is to approximate the value functions by linear functions of the formV t (x t ) = θ t + i∈L v it x it . To decide what values to choose for {θ t : t ∈ T } and {v it : i ∈ L, t ∈ T }, we replace V t (x t ) with θ t + i∈L v it x it to obtain the linear program
where {θ t : t ∈ T } and {v it : i ∈ L, t ∈ T } are the decision variables. The number of decision variables in the problem above is manageable and we can deal with the large number of constraints by using constraint generation. Letting {θ * t : t ∈ T } and {v * it : i ∈ L, t ∈ T } be an optimal solution to the problem above andV * t (x t ) = θ * t + i∈L v * it x it , we approximate the value functions {V t (x t ) :
. Therefore, LV also provides an upper bound on the maximum total expected revenue over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }.
Experimental Setup
We consider an airline network that serves N spokes out of a single hub. This is a key network structure that frequently arises in practice. Associated with each spoke, there are two flight legs, one of which is to the hub and the other one is from the hub. There is a high-fare and a low-fare itinerary that connects each origin-destination pair. Consequently, we have 2N flight legs and 2N (N + 1) itineraries, 4N of which involve one flight leg and 2N (N − 1) of which involve two flight legs. The revenue associated with each high-fare itinerary is κ times higher than the revenue associated with the corresponding low-fare itinerary. The probability of a request for each high-fare itinerary increases over time, whereas the probability of a request for each low-fare itinerary decreases over time. Since t∈T j∈J p jt a ij is the total expected demand for the capacity on flight leg i, we measure the tightness of the leg capacities by
. Figure 1 shows the structure of the network for the case where N = 6.
We vary τ , N , α and κ to obtain different test problems and label our test problems by (τ, N, α, κ) ∈ {200, 600} × {4, 5, 6, 8} × {1.0, 1.2, 1.6} × {4, 8}. To give a better feel for our experimental setup, Table  1 shows the average capacities per flight leg in our test problems. In this table, we note that two test problems that only differ in κ take place over the same network and use the same leg capacities. The online supplement provides the complete data for our test problems.
Computational Results
As mentioned in Sections 2, 5 and 6.1, LR, DLP, RLP and LV provide upper bounds on the maximum total expected revenue over the time periods {1, . . . , τ }. Tables 2 and 3 The results indicate that LR consistently provides the tightest upper bounds. On the average, the upper bounds obtained by LR are respectively 5.2%, 3.6% and 4.2% tighter than those obtained by DLP, RLP and LV. For the test problems with α = 1.0, the upper bounds obtained by RLP are noticeably tighter than those obtained by LV, whereas for the test problems with α = 1.6, the upper bounds obtained by LV are noticeably tighter than those obtained by RLP. Therefore, the tightness of the leg capacities seems to be an important factor affecting the quality of the upper bounds obtained by RLP and LV. It is not surprising that DLP consistently provides the loosest upper bounds. In particular, Proposition 4 in this paper, Section 4.1 in Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) and Theorem 1 in Adelman (2007) respectively show that the upper bounds obtained by LR, RLP and LV are provably tighter than the upper bound obtained by DLP.
Tables 4 and 5 respectively show the performances of the bid prices obtained by different solution methods for the test problems with 200 and 600 time periods. The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh columns in these tables respectively show the total expected revenues obtained by LR, DLP, RLP, DFD, RFD and LV. We estimate these total expected revenues by simulating the performances of different solution methods under 100 demand trajectories. We use common random numbers when simulating the performances of different solution methods. The eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth columns show the percent gaps between the total expected revenues obtained by LR and the other five solution methods.
The results indicate that LR consistently provides the highest total expected revenues. The perfor- mance gaps between LR and the other five solution methods are statistically significant at 95% level for all of the test problems. For a majority of the test problems, RLP and RFD compete for the second and third places, and LV, DFD and DLP have respectively the fourth, fifth and sixth places. On the average, the total expected revenues obtained by LR are respectively 8.9%, 3.7%, 5.5%, 3.5% and 4.6% higher than those obtained by DLP, RLP, DFD, RFD and LV. It is especially surprising that the total expected revenues obtained by RLP and RFD can be noticeably higher than those obtained by LV. In particular, RLP and RFD use a simple randomization scheme on the deterministic linear program. The bid prices obtained by these two solution methods depend on the probability distributions of the total numbers of itinerary requests, but not on the order in which the itinerary requests arrive. On the other hand, the bid prices obtained by LV depend both on the probability distributions of the total numbers of itinerary requests and on the order in which the itinerary requests arrive.
To illustrate how different problem parameters affect the performance gaps, the five data series in Figure 2 plot the performance gaps between LR and the other five solution methods for all of the test problems. In this figure, blocks of six consecutive test problems in the horizontal axis share the same problem parameters other than the tightness of the leg capacities and the revenue difference between the high-fare and low-fare itineraries. The "triangular" patterns of especially the first, third and fifth data series indicate that the performance gaps between LR and DLP, LR and DFD, and LR and LV grow as the leg capacities get tighter and the revenue differences between the high-fare and low-fare itineraries get larger. For test problems with tight leg capacities and large revenue differences between LR vs. LR vs. LR vs. No. (τ, N, α, κ) ( the high-fare and low-fare itineraries, the cost of making an "incorrect" decision is quite high. For these test problems, LR provides especially good performance when compared with the other solution methods.
The performances of DLP and DFD can be sensitive to the number of times that we refine the bid prices; see Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) . Tables 6 and 7 respectively show the performances of DLP and DFD for the test problems with 200 and 600 time periods when we refine the bid prices 20 times over the decision horizon. For comparison purpose, the second column in these tables shows the total expected revenues obtained by LR when we refine the value function approximations five times over the decision horizon. The third and fourth columns respectively show the total expected revenues obtained by DLP and DFD when we refine the bid prices 20 times over the decision horizon. The fifth and sixth columns show the percent gaps between the total expected revenues obtained by LR and the other two solution methods. Comparing the total expected revenues obtained by DLP and DFD in Tables 6 and  7 with those in Tables 4 and 5 , we note that the performances of DLP and DFD improve noticeably when we refine the bid prices more frequently. Nevertheless, the total expected revenues obtained by LR are still significantly higher than those obtained by DLP and DFD.
To give a feel for how the computational effort for LR scales with problem size, Figure 3 shows the CPU seconds required for one subgradient optimization iteration as a function of the average capacity per flight leg. In this figure, we consider test problems with τ = 600 and N = 8. The results indicate that the CPU seconds required for one subgradient optimization iteration scale slightly worse than linearly with the average capacity per flight leg.
Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a new method to compute bid prices in network revenue management problems. The novel aspect of our method is that it generates bid prices that depend on how much time is left until the time of departure and how much capacity is left on the flight legs. Our method naturally decomposes the network revenue management problem by the flight legs and allows us to compute bid prices by concentrating on one flight leg at a time. When compared with the linear programming-based methods for computing bid prices, our method requires more computational power, but it noticeably improves the upper bounds on the maximum total expected revenues and provides bid prices that obtain significantly higher total expected revenues. 6 (200, 8, 1.2, 4) 16,941 16,114 16,432 4.9 3.0 (200, 8, 1.2, 8) 28,130 25,625 26,684 8.9 5.1 (200, 8, 1.6, 4) 14,720 13,830 14,265 6.0 3.1 (200, 8, 1.6, 8) 25,701 22,780 24,178 11.4 5.9 Table 7 : Total expected revenues obtained by DLP and DFD for the test problems with 600 time periods when we refine the bid prices 20 times over the decision horizon.
